An organisation's records are its own (D5) and outlive the software (U-27): it can take all of them with it at any time, in open formats that open without OpsCommand, and leave. A person can see what OpsCommand holds about them and have it erased (GDPR Articles 15, 17 and 20 — the compliance register, compliance/REGISTER.md, has the row).
An organisation's export
Administration → Data → Export the organisation (GET /v1/organisations/{org}/export, organisation.manage and audit.read) downloads one ZIP:
| Path | What |
|---|---|
manifest.json | What the export holds and the SHA-256 of every part. Its schema is published: schemas/organisation-export.v1.schema.json, and travels inside the export. |
reference.json | The organisation, its people (id, e-mail address, name), and the catalogue the records point to: roles, permissions, the incident lifecycle. |
data/<schema>.<table>.json | Every table of the organisation's records, one JSON array of rows each, in primary-key order. Authoritative. |
data/<schema>.<table>.csv | The same rows as CSV. A cell a spreadsheet would run (=, +, -, @) is prefixed with an apostrophe. |
files/ | Reporters' attachments, handover attachments and monitor screenshots. |
verify.mjs | Checks everything with Node alone (published copy). |
README.txt | The above, for whoever opens it in 2036. |
Complete by construction. The database finds the tables to export from its own catalogue at the time of the export (core.export_tables()): every table that holds an organisation's rows, so a table added in a later version is exported without changing this code.
Never a secret. Left out entirely: keys and sealed secrets, idempotency and sign-in state, the sealed delivery queue, search vectors, counters (core.export_excluded_tables()). Left out of every table: binary columns (the files they hold are under files/) and token columns (core.export_excluded_columns()). Each table's manifest entry lists what it left out.
Verifiable without OpsCommand. node verify.mjs <folder> checks every file against its SHA-256 and every table's row count, and the audit chain entry by entry: each entry carries prev_hash, hash and canonical (base64 of the exact bytes OpsCommand hashed), so hash = SHA-256(prev_hash ‖ canonical) can be recomputed, the links followed, and the bytes compared with what the entry says. A changed row, a missing file or a forged audit entry is found. The verifier prints the SHA-256 of manifest.json; OpsCommand's export log (Administration → Data) records the same, so anyone can show which export a copy is.
Limits of version 1: the archive is built in memory and is a ZIP without ZIP64 (up to 4 GB and 65,534 entries); the largest organisations will need a streamed export, which the format allows without change.
Closing and erasure
- Closing (
POST /v1/organisations/{org}/close,organisation.manage): the organisation's short address typed to confirm, a reason, and an export made in the 24 hours before. Access ends for everyone at once. - Reopening (
POST /v1/platform/organisations/{id}/reopen, platform administrators, with a reason) while it is not erased. - Erasure (
POST /v1/platform/organisations/{id}/erase, platform administrators, with a reason; only a closed organisation): every record of the organisation is deleted, its audit chain with it — the organisation has its chain in its export. What OpsCommand must keep as the seller stays: the billing account and invoices, under bookkeeping law, and a tombstone of the organisation holding nothing of it ("Erased organisation") for those invoices to name. The erasure is recorded inplatform.erasuresand in the platform's own audit chain, with the counts per table and the fingerprint of the last export. - When erasure follows closing is the owner's policy; nothing here erases on a timer. The platform console (step 7.12, Organisations under
/platform) gives staff these two actions, each with a reason.
A person's own data
On Profile (/me):
- Download my data (
GET /v1/me/export): the account, memberships and roles in each organisation, what the person wrote on incidents, notifications, preferences, devices, their actions in the audit records and their reads in the access log. - Erase me (
POST /v1/me/erasure, the address typed to confirm): memberships and roles end, team places, notifications, preferences and devices are deleted, and the account's address, name and sign-in identity are replaced by a placeholder; the person is signed out and a later sign-in starts a new account. What they wrote stays in the organisations' records, shown as written by a former member: those records are the organisations' own. Refused while the person is the last who can manage roles in an active organisation (hand over first), and for platform staff.
The erasure itself is audited without the values it removes. Earlier audit entries stay: the audit chain is append-only evidence. Among them, the platform chain's record of the account's creation holds the address it signed up with. Whether to keep that under GDPR Article 17(3) or to move the platform chain to keyed pseudonyms is the owner's decision (compliance register).
Where
- Database: migration
0053_export_erasure(core.export_*,core.record_export,core.exports,core.close_organisation,platform.reopen_organisation,platform.erase_organisation,platform.erasures,core.export_person,core.erase_me; the audit capture and append-only guard learn the two erasures, each checked against state a session cannot fake). - API:
portability.controller.ts,zip.ts(a ZIP writer on Node's ownzlib),export-assets.ts(verifier, schema, README; kept identical todocs/schemas/by a test). - Web: Administration → Data; Your data on the profile.